Ostraka: Secure Blockchain Scaling by Node Sharding by Manuskin, Alex et al.
Ostraka: Secure Blockchain Scaling by Node Sharding
Alex Manuskin
Technion, IC3
amanusk@pm.me
Michael Mirkin
Technion, IC3
michael.mirkin@gmail.com
Ittay Eyal
Technion, IC3
ittay@technion.ac.il
Abstract—Cryptocurrencies, implemented with blockchain
protocols, promise to become a global payment system if they
can overcome performance limitations. Rapidly advancing
architectures improve on latency and throughput, but most
require all participating servers to process all transactions.
Several recent works propose to shard the system, such that
each machine would only process a subset of the transactions.
However, we identify a denial-of-service attack that is
exposed by these solutions – an attacker can generate trans-
actions that would overload a single shard, thus delaying
processing in the entire system. Moreover, we show that
in common scenarios, these protocols require most node
operators to process almost all blockchain transactions.
We present Ostraka, a blockchain node architecture that
shards (parallelizes) the nodes themselves. We prove that
replacing a unified node with an Ostraka node does not
affect the security of the underlying consensus mechanism.
We evaluate analytically and experimentally block prop-
agation and processing in various settings. Ostraka allows
nodes in the network to scale, without costly coordination.
In our experiments, Ostraka nodes transaction processing
rate grows linearly with the addition of resources.
Index Terms—Distributed systems, Blockchain, Network se-
curity
1. Introduction
Payment systems are typically controlled by trusted
entities – central banks control supply by printing money,
banks transact among each other with a central na-
tional [34] or international [33] mechanism, and credit
card companies [36] authorize their clients’ transactions.
This centralization of power implies limitations of the
users’ freedom [31], less resilience, and high fees [5].
Since their introduction with Bitcoin [29], cryptocur-
rencies brought the promise of a decentralized global
payment system outside the control of a single entity.
Such a system is potentially useful for payment among
individuals, but also among banks, machines (IoT), and
micro-payments for social network interactions.
So far, blockchains systems – the decentralized mech-
anism on which cryptocurrencies operate – could not
reach rates desired for global payment systems. Early
system implementations suffered from a consensus bot-
tleneck, limiting them to less than a dozen transactions
per second [37] and they cannot scale by tuning their
parameters [15].
More recent protocols [1], [6], [13], [20], [22], [24],
[25], [32], [38] overcome the consensus bottleneck, but
they are limited by the processing capacity of the nodes
comprising the system. We provide background in §2.
Each node is required to store and process each block
broadcasted on the network. As the number of transactions
grows, and the longer the blockchain exists, it becomes
increasingly difficult for nodes to keep up. Existing de-
signs, where each node is operated on a single machine
are not equipped to scale with the rising demand.
Several recent solutions [2], [26], [28], [39] propose to
shard the blockchain, splitting it into multiple interleaved
subchains. Each subchain is maintained by a distinct set
of nodes, and so each node does not have to process all
transactions in the system but only those in its subchain.
This allows the system to process transactions at a higher
rate while reducing the load on the individual node.
Those solutions target democratic environments, where
there are many participants with similar resources. In
such environments, increasing the number of participants
allows to increase the number of subchains and thus
system capacity. However, we show that when resource
distribution is not democratic, as is the case in most
popular cryptocurrencies, the security and performance of
those systems deteriorate. We show how they could be
vulnerable to attacks, and why they do not necessarily
provide the benefits of lowering the burden on the single
node. We discuss these solutions and related work in §3.
In this work, we present Ostraka, a novel architecture
that allows for linear scaling of blockchain nodes capacity
to meet network requirements. Ostraka enables scaling
without forfeiting security assumptions. Rather than par-
titioning the system’s state into separately-managed clus-
ters, in Ostraka we scale the nodes themselves, splitting
each node across multiple Node-Shards (NSs), allowing
vertical scaling of each node. The challenge is creating a
partitioning scheme that achieves several goals. Data must
be accessible in O(1) while keeping the system secure and
preventing an adversary from slowing down the validation
process across the network. We describe the architecture
in §4.
The implication is that nodes require more resources,
so fewer entities will run such nodes (e.g hundreds instead
of thousands currently in Bitcoin [14] and Ethereum [19]).
We argue, however, that the same is true for subchain
based proposals, where only an optimistic democratic
setup would lead to better decentralization. In more re-
alistic setups, with similar properties to those in active
systems today, they would also imply a smaller number of
full participants. Importantly, the decrease in node count
does not mean that the system becomes closed: Anyone
can still join the system and participate in the protocol.
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Meanwhile, as with current cryptocurrencies, end-users
who send and receive payments can still use their mobile
devices by querying a few nodes.
Ostraka is a node architecture and is thus indepen-
dent of the underlying consensus protocol. We achieve
improved throughput by applying a novel block validation
algorithm, that allows even distribution of all aspects
of block validations across multiple machines (§4). We
demonstrate how we achieve these properties, without
formfitting existing security guarantees.
We prove that the security guarantees of the protocol
are the same as those of a theoretical high-performance
unified (standard) node (§5). In contrast to existing so-
lutions [29], [35], Ostraka does not regard transaction
order within each block. This avoids expensive locking
mechanisms requiring elaborate communication. We prove
the correctness of this crucial enabler of distributed ex-
ecution and show that the Ostraka distributed node is
operationally indistinguishable from a unified-node, de-
spite order changes and processing parallelization. Next,
we show that an attacker can only perform a denial-of-
service (DoS) attack against a small number of Ostraka
nodes with high probability.
We evaluate Ostraka’s block propagation in a variety
of configurations and network conditions. We show that
an Ostraka node’s processing rate grows nearly optimally
with the number of NSs. We provide theoretical analysis
for the node performance as a function of inter- and
intra-node bandwidth. We measure the performance of
Ostraka in transaction processing with as many as 64 NSs,
achieving a rate of nearly 400k transactions per second.
We demonstrate the effect of Ostraka on a full system
through simulation of Bitcoin-NG [20], achieving an order
of magnitude improvement. Evaluation details are in §6.
In summary, our main contributions are:
• Analysis of previous scaling solutions in non-
democratic environments;
• Ostraka – a novel blockchain scaling architecture;
• Proof that Ostraka does not reduce security compared
to a unified node architecture;
• Theoretical performance analysis showing linear
scaling – up to network limits;
• Node implementation performance matching theory;
• A full system simulation.
2. Preliminaries: The UTXO Model
Ostraka utilizes the UTXO model [4], [9], [30] that
was introduced in Bitcoin and is used in many systems.
We describe here the elements relevant to this work.
Transaction. Each transaction comprises two lists –
inputs and outputs. The outputs are the new records
indicating ownership of amounts. Each transaction is
uniquely identified by a hash of its contents, TxHash.
An input of a transaction references an output it spends
by the TxHash of the transaction containing the output
and its index in its output list. To spend an output, a
spending condition must be satisfied, usually providing
a cryptographic signature.
Node data structures. To operate a blockchain system,
each of the nodes maintains three data structures: a set of
transactions that were not yet placed in the blockchain –
the mempool; the blockchain itself, a series of blocks
containing transactions; and the current system state – the
UTXO set.
Users create transactions and broadcast them, and
the nodes store them in their mempools. Once a miner
constructs a block from transactions in its mempool, she
publishes the block to its peers. When the node receives a
new block, it removes all outputs spent by transactions in
the block from the UTXO set and adds the newly created
outputs. The state of the UTXO set is thus the state of the
blockchain following each block.
Security in Proof-of-Work Blockchains. In a PoW
blockchain, block propagation time directly affects system
security. Nakamoto consensus states that the most up-to-
date state of the blockchain is the chain with the most
work (the longest chain). If block propagation is slow, it
takes time until other miners become aware of the new
block. So two (or more) miners might generate blocks
with the same predecessor. This split is called a fork.
To prevent forks, block propagation time must be
much shorter than the interval between blocks. However,
if nodes do not validate blocks before propagating them
further, the system could be susceptible to DoS attacks,
by flooding the system with invalid blocks. Reducing
block processing time is therefore critical to blockchain
security [15], [17], [21].
3. Sub-chain Analysis and Related Work
We overview current approaches to scaling blockchain
performance, starting with novel security and performance
analysis of proposals to split the system into subchains.
3.1. Concurrent subchains (Sharding)
With this approach, the system is divided into serveral
subchains. Each subchain is maintained by a commit-
tee running a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocol,
tolerant of an adversary of up to 1/3 of the network.
Elastico [28] was one of the first proposals of this scheme.
OmniLedger [26] uses subchains and builds on top of
ByzCoin [25]. RapidChain [39] closely follows the ideas
presented in Elastico and OmniLedger but proposes dif-
ferent solutions to committee election and cross-subchain
transactions, not dependent on the user. Both OmniLedger
and RapidChain use the UTXO model to distribute trans-
actions across subchains. Chainspace [2] suggests a sim-
ilar solution for a smart contracts system [37].
DoS vulnerability. These systems can be vulnerable
to DoS attacks. Transactions are assigned to subchains
according to their TxHash. An attacker can overwhelm
a single subchain with many transactions much more
cheaply than saturating the entire system. Other subchains
are also throttled due to transactions that originate from
multiple subchains.
We evaluate the effectiveness of this attack. Consider
a system of n subchains and transactions with a single
output and k inputs. The probability of a transaction to
either have its output or one of its inputs in the subchain
undergoing the attack is the complement of the proba-
bility that the output and all inputs not in the attacked
subchain, 1− (n−1n )k+1. Note that this is a lower bound:
The number of transactions not able to execute is even
higher when considering transaction dependant on pend-
ing transactions. Fig. 1 illustrates this result. It shows, for
example, that even with 2-3 inputs, in a 2-subchain system
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Figure 2. Ratio of mining power requiring participation in all
subchains
about 90% of transactions are affected, but even with 16
subchains about 20% of the transactions are affected.
Performance. Sub-chain systems use various mecha-
nisms for cross-subchain transactions. OmniLedger [26]
uses 2-phase commit; it requires the client to obtain proofs
of spending from each subchain where she wants input
to be spent. RapidChain [39] relies on the leader of the
output subchain to create new outputs, mirroring outputs
spent on input subchains. In both approaches, since most
transactions affect multiple subchains, the additional over-
head is considerable. The architecture of Ostraka avoids
this limitation.
Node load. Ostraka nodes distribute the data internally,
such that every node maintains the entire state. This is
seemingly a difference from subchain systems where each
node only maintains a subset of the state. However, as we
show below, this difference only holds in what we call
democratic environments, where there are many miners
(stakeholders for PoS) with similar mining power [26],
[28], [39]. In non-democratic environments, where the
number of miners is small, subchain systems also require
nodes to store the entire state. Prominent systems relying
either on PoW or PoS are typically non-democratic [16],
[21], and recent findings [27] shows that indeed true
decentralization is not possible in any Sybil protection
mechanism used today. As of today, in Bitcoin, for exam-
ple, about 85% of the mining power is controlled by 10
mining entities [10].
Recall that subchain systems rely on BFT protocols
to maintain each of the subchains. The underlying BFT
protocol assumes a bound on the number of Byzantine
nodes, where a node is a unit of mining power. Even if
the bound holds for the entire system (e.g., less than a third
of the mining power belongs to malicious principals), in
order to guarantee the bound, there should be sufficiently
many nodes in each subchain [26]. With a 25% adversary,
each subchain should have at least 600 nodes [26]. Stud-
ies [21] show that PoW systems are as decentralized as 20
nodes operating in a quorum, a far cry from the hundreds
required for good security. Since the number of principals
is not necessarily this large, participants instead split their
mining power such that every mining power unit allows its
owner one virtual node or share in the system. To prevent
an attacker from targeting a specific subchain, each share
is assigned to a subchain uniformly at random.
We estimate the minimal miner size for which a miner
will have shares in most of the subchains. Denote by S the
number of nodes per subchain and by n the number of sub-
chains. Let r be the target ratio of subchains that should
be occupied in expectation and denote the miner size to
achieve the target by α. The number of shares belonging
to the miner is αnS. The expected number of subchains
occupied by the miner is therefore n
(
1− (n−1n )αnS).
This expression should equal the target number of sub-
chains, rn, and solving for α we get α = log(1−r)Sn log(1−1/n) .
To obtain concrete numbers, we take S to be either 300
or 600 as required by Kogias et al. [26] and vary the
number of subchains, n, from 1 to 32. We target an
expected 90% of the subchains and obtain the results
shown in Fig. 2. Indeed, even with only 300 nodes per
subchain and 32 subchains, a miner would participate
in 90% of the subchains in expectation if its size is larger
than 0.8%
The implication is that in non-democratic scenarios,
which are common in active blockchains, the miners must
participate in all subchains, requiring them to process the
entire chain, therefore not achieving the goal of reducing
stress on the single node.
3.2. Node scaling proposals
Dickerson et al. [18], implement concurrent execution
in smart contracts in a virtual machine model as used
in Ethereum [37]. They add a concurrent schedule to
each block, enabling consistent parallel execution across
different nodes. However, the nature of the VM model
limits the level of their measured speed up to 2x. Read-
after-Write dependencies of instructions in the VM model
enforce a sequential execution to avoid an inconsistent
state. Ostraka does not suffer from these limitations; we
observed an improvement of two orders of magnitude,
limited only by the network and the capacity of our
experimental testbed.
4. Architecture
We proceed to describe the structure and operation of
Ostraka. An Ostraka node operates similarly to a unified
node. The key difference is that in Ostraka the mempool,
UTXO set, and blockchain storage are distributed among
several machines, called node-shards (NSs).
We describe the system components (§4.1), explain the
techniques used to make it efficient and secure (§4.2), and
overview system operation (§4.3).
4.1. System Components
In Ostraka a coordinator keeps track of the blockchain
and orchestrates communication within the node (intra-
node) and with other nodes (inter-node). We refer to the
NSs of the same node as sibling NSs. The coordinator can
operate as a separate machine or as a process on one of the
NSs. In Ostraka work distribution is local on each node
and does not mandate the same number of NSs per node.
Transactions are distributed among NSs as atomic units.
Transaction outputs are stored in the UTXO-shard of the
NS they are assigned to. Note we assume complete trust
among the NSs and the coordinator within a node.
Coordinator. The coordinator orchestrates the node
operation. When the node is first initialized, all NSs
connect to the coordinator. The coordinator coordinates
communication between sibling NSs and with other nodes.
The coordinator tracks the state of the blockchain. It
stores the header of each block and determines the main
chain (e.g., with most PoW in Bitcoin and Ethereum).
It instructs the NSs of which blocks to request, process,
and validate. In the case of a reorg (rollback of state,
which is possible in some blockchains), the coordinator
commands the NSs to roll back their state to the block of
the divergence and start following the new chain.
Node-Shards. Each NS is assigned a local ShardID.
The ShardID determines which transactions the NS is re-
sponsible for. Once all NSs are connected, the coordinator
sends each NS the ShardID, IP address, and port of all
sibling NSs. Next, NSs connect to form a clique. Via the
ShardID, each transaction is mapped to the NS responsible
for storing it and its outputs.
Each NS stores transactions in a block-shard – a
portion of a block that contains only transactions assigned
to its ShardID. It similarly stores UTXOs in a UTXO-
shard, and pending transactions in its mempool shard.
4.2. System Design
We proceed to describe the details of the components’
interaction. The design sets to achieve several goals that
seem contradictory. First, transaction lookup should be
an O(1) operation so block validation is quick. Transac-
tion to NS assignment should allow for efficient commu-
nication between NSs. Nevertheless, an adversary should
not be able to overload any single NS. Ostraka achieves
all these goals as follows.
Transaction inputs reference previous transaction out-
puts by TxHash and the index of the output in the
transaction. Each TxHash is unique to a transaction (we
use SHA-256). Therefore, TxHash is the natural index
for transactions.
Any-order execution. In unified blockchain clients,
storage and processing are all performed on a single
machine (e.g., [29], [37]), transactions in a block are
ordered as a list. A transaction can only spend outputs
created in a previous block or earlier in the same block’s
list. We call this common approach, the topological-order
algorithm. Using a topological order in Ostraka would
have implied unnecessary dependencies, requiring costly
coordination among NSs. Instead, Ostraka treats each
block as an unordered set of transactions. Dependencies
of a transaction are satisfied if the referenced output is
in an earlier block or anywhere in the current block. We
justify the correctness of unordered block validation in
Section §5.
Adding salt. When considering how to distribute trans-
actions equally among NSs, one option to simply take
the TxHash of each transaction, and map it to a shard
using a deterministic function (e.g. taking the MSBs of
the hash). This method relies on the natural distribution
of the SHA-256 value of each transaction. However,
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Figure 3. Two connected Ostraka nodes, with intra-node connections
this would allow an attacker to cheaply form transactions
that would all be assigned to the same NS on all nodes.
The processing speed of all nodes would then be 1/`
(for ` NSs), achieving DoS. We further analyzed DoS
susceptibility in Section 5.2.
To prevent such attacks, each node generates a random
salt upon initialization. We use the salt and apply it
to each transactions with an additional hash as follows:
NewTxHash = SHA-256(TxHash||salt). By applying
a deterministic function to the NewTxHash, we distinctly
map a transaction to a NS, Outputs in the UTXO set are
stored with the original TxHash, while the NewTxHash
is used internally to distribute transaction between NSs.
The coordinator publishes the chosen salt to its NSs
and remote nodes. Thus, peers know the NewTxHash for
the specific salt of the peer, and only sends transactions
relevant to the requesting NS’s ShardID. This way network
bandwidth is distributed among the NSs and each NS
receives only transactions it requires. Direct NS to NS
communication between nodes avoids bottlenecks.
Note. Routing all transactions through the coordinator
would allow us to keep the salts secret, making DoS
attacks harder. But as expected, our experiments show that
with this design the coordinator becomes a bottleneck.
4.3. Operation
We proceed to describe networking and Ostraka’s
distributed block validation.
Establishing connections. Nodes connect to each other
according to the system’s topology rules (e.g., several
random peers in Bitcoin). When the rules indicate that
node A should connect with node B, the two coordinators
connect, and all NSs of node A connect to all NSs of node
B. An example is presented in Fig 3
Block validation. When a node receives a new block,
it sends an INVENTORY message to its peers, informing
them that a new block has been produced. The receiving
coordinator informs its NSs of the new block hash and the
peer who has it. Each NS requests the relevant transactions
from all the NSs of the peer. It sends the peer NSs its local
ShardID and the block hash it is interested in. Each NS of
the sending node iterates over the transactions associated
with the block hash and calculates the NewTxHash using
the salt. The sending NS sends the requester only relevant
transactions.
Block validation comprises block header validation,
where most operations are performed in O(1), and trans-
action validation, where operations are O(n) (n is the
number of transactions in the block). Block header val-
idation is performed by the coordinator. It checks for
duplicates, PoW, correct reference hash, etc.
The exception is Merkle root validation. The coor-
dinator performs Merkle root validation which is linear
in n. First, NSs calculate the hashes of their transactions,
the leaves of the Merkle tree, and send them to the
coordinator. On a node with ` NSs and a block with n
transactions, each NS is performing n/` hash operations.
The coordinator lexicographically sorts the transactions by
hash and then calculates the remaining n hashes to build
the root. This process could in principle be delegated to
NSs by replacing the Merkle tree with an accumulator [7],
[8], but their group operations result in performance that
is significantly worse than the Merkle tree calculation.
NSs perform their part of block validation concurrently
with the coordinator. The coordinator awaits approval
from all NSs before adding the current block to the
chain. If at any point one of the NSs comes across an
illegal transaction, it sends a BADBLOCK message to the
coordinator, who then discards the block.
Fig. 4 summarizes the steps of block propagation and
validation. To validate a transaction, a NS must first obtain
all the required information. A NS only has its share of
UTXOs in the UTXO set. It constructs a list of missing
outputs to request from each sibling NS by using the
TxHash, the salt, and the ShardID. Requests to each
NS are sent in a batch. Upon request, each NS sends the
transaction output to the requester.
Once an output has been requested, it is marked as
spent. Multiple requests for the same output indicate a
double-spend attempt, and will thus trigger a BADBLOCK
message to the coordinator. Once it receives all transaction
outputs, the NS proceeds to validate the scripts. These
checks include:
• Equal sum: For each transaction, the aggregate
amount of inputs is at least as high as the outputs.
• No double spends: Each input references an output
that was produced but not spent.
• Authorization: Each input complies with the spend-
ing condition of the output it consumes.
Other operations. Other inter-node operations are eas-
ily implemented in Ostraka. Peers can request transaction
directly from NSs, and block headers from the coordinator.
One special case is that of a reorg. A reorg happens
when a node needs to switch the chain it follows. The
coordinator and NSs must roll back to a state of a previous
block, then update it to the longest chain.
A reorg is performed as follows: First, the coordinator
sends the hashes of blocks to roll back, as well as the
hashes of the new blocks. Each NS fetches the spent
outputs records of the rolled-back block from the database.
Each NS adds the spent outputs of each transaction in
the block to the UTXO-shard. Next, it removes all out-
puts created by transactions in the blocks-shard from
the UTXO-shard. No communication is required among
the NSs during the rollback, and it can thus be quickly
resolved.
5. Security
Ostraka can be used in conjunction with many consen-
sus protocols (e.g., [20], [24], [25], [32], [38]). We thus
need to prove that a system using Ostraka is at least as
secure as a system using a unified node.
We start by showing that Ostraka behaves as a unified
node (§5.1). Beyond functionality, blockchain protocols
rely on propagation time to maintain security. Therefore
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Figure 4. Ostraka block transmission and validation messages.
we also show that Ostraka’s design does not enable attacks
on node processing time. We show how individual-node
shuffling prevents an adversary from affecting macro sys-
tem performance (§5.2).
5.1. Functional Indistinguishability
Blockchain systems typically [20], [25], [29], [37]
form blocks that are ordered such that each transaction fol-
lows transactions it depends on. We call this a topological-
order System.
In contrast, Ostraka is agnostic the internal order.
We call such a system an unordered system. Of course,
topologically ordered blocks may be invalid in a system
that expects lexicographically ordered blocks, and vice
versa. The Ostraka algorithm would except a block created
by Bitcoin miners, but not every out-of-order block, would
be accepted in Bitcoin without changes to the validation
rules. We thus need to show that any set of transactions
can be processed as a legal block in a topological system
if and only if they can be processed as a legal block
in the unordered system. We leave it for future work to
explore if Ostraka can be integrated with Bitcoin as it
exists today. As the resulting Merkle root depends on
transaction ordering, this might not be possible without
a hard fork.
We show that an unordered system is functionally
indistinguishable from a Topological-order system.
From topological to unordered systems. Most stages
of block validation (cf. §4.3) like signature and PoW ver-
ification are agnostic to transaction order. Two exceptions
are the Merkle tree calculation and transaction dependency
checks.
Merkle tree calculation depends on the transaction
order, but the choice of the order does not matter as long
as all nodes calculate it consistently. For this purpose,
Ostraka orders transactions lexicographically, according to
their TxHash.
It remains to show that any set of transactions can
be processed as a legal block in a topological system if
and only if they can be processed as a legal block in the
unordered system.
To formally state this claim we first specify the two
block-validation algorithms. Both take a UTXO set and
a set of transactions and return either the updated UTXO
set or ⊥ if the transactions cannot form a legal block.
Algorithm 1: Topological AT
Input : Set of transactions T , UTXO_set
Output: New UTXO_set or ⊥
1 (t1, t2, . . . , tk)← T sorted in topological order
2 foreach TX← t1, t2, . . . , tk do
3 foreach Ref Out in TX do
4 if Ref Out 6∈ UTXO_set then
5 return ⊥
6 else
7 UTXO_set← UTXO_set \ {Ref Out}
8 foreach TX out in TX do
9 UTXO_set← UTXO_set ∪ {TX out}
10 Validate TX
11 return UTXO_set
The topological-order system algorithm denoted AT ,
is shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm receives
a UTXO_set and the set of transactions T . The algorithm
first sorts T topologically and then processes the transac-
tions in order. It is important to note that the set T can
always be ordered topologically: cycles between transac-
tions cannot form since the references are by transaction
hash. Assuming SHA-256 can be modeled as a random
oracle, Harris [23] shows that for a space of 2κ, the
expected number of steps to find a cycle is 14
√
2pi2κ,
therefore an adversary cannot find such a cycle except with
negligible probability in the hash output size. Therefore
the sorting algorithm is well defined.
The algorithm returns ⊥ if at some point it encounters
a transaction whose input is in not in the UTXO_set.
For each transaction, the operation Valitates TX (line 10),
covers all additional transaction validation steps after the
referenced outputs were found, e.g., script validation, cor-
rect sum etc. If Validate TX fails, it returns ⊥.
The unordered system algorithm denoted AU , is
shown in Algorithm 2. Unlike Algorithm AT , in AU
transactions are not ordered. All outputs are first added to
the UTXO_set, then the algorithm processes the trans-
actions sequentially in an arbitrary order. Other than that,
the operation is similar to AT .
Algorithm 2: Unordered (AU )
Input : Set of transactions T , UTXO_set
Output: New UTXO_set or ⊥
1 foreach TX ∈ T do
2 foreach TX out in TX do
3 UTXO_set← UTXO_set ∪ {TX out}
4 foreach TX ∈ T do
5 foreach Ref Out by TX do
6 if Ref Out 6∈ UTXO_set then
7 return ⊥
8 else
9 UTXO_set← UTXO_set \ {Ref Out}
10 Validate TX
11 return UTXO_set
We show that Algorithms AT and AU are functionally
indistinguishable.
Lemma 1. Given the same UTXO_set and set of trans-
actions T , AT and AU return the same value.
We prove the lemma by showing that AT returns ⊥
if and only if AU returns ⊥:
Proof. We prove in both directions.
AT → AU . We first show that if AT rejects an input
tuple (T,UTXO_set) then AU also rejects this input.
If AT returns ⊥, there exists some transaction TXi ∈
T , at index i, and an input in TXi, referencing an UTXO
Ref Out 6∈ UTXO_set, produced by an output TX out.
This can be a result of three cases, and we show that AU
rejects as well.
1) The UTXO is not in the UTXO_set and is not pro-
duced by any transaction preceding TXi: There can be
no transaction succeeding TXi which produces TX out
as it contradicts the topological order, thus, there is not
any transaction producing output TX out in T . Upon
processing TXi, AU return ⊥ (Algorithm 2 line 7).
2) The UTXO is not in the UTXO_set and is produced
by some transaction TXk, preceding TXi but consumed
by some transaction TXj , succeeding TXk but preceding
TXi: In AU , TX out is added to the UTXO_set in line 3,
AU processes either TXj or TXi first. Without loss of
generality, TXi is processed first. Upon processing TXj ,
AU would not find UTXO Ref Out in the UTXO_set
and return ⊥ (Algorithm 2 line 7).
3) The UTXO is in the UTXO_set and it is consumed by
some transaction TXj , preceding TXi: Similarly to the pre-
vious case, except now the UTXO is in the UTXO_set.
AU → AT . If AU returns ⊥, there exists some trans-
action TXi ∈ T , and an input Ref Out in TXi, referencing
an UTXO Ref Out 6∈ UTXO_set produced by an output
TX out. This can also be a result of three cases, and we
show that AT rejects as well.
1) The UTXO is not in the UTXO_set and is not pro-
duced by any transaction in T : In AT , the UTXO is not
produced by any transaction in T and specifically, by any
transaction preceding TXi in the topological order of T in
AT . Thus AT return ⊥.
2) The UTXO is not in the UTXO_set and is pro-
duced by some transaction TXk, but is also consumed
by some transaction TXj : In the topological order of T ,
both TXj and TXi must succeed TXk. Transaction TXk
is processed first and adds Ref Out to the UTXO_set.
Without loss of generality, TXi is processed first and
removes Ref Out from the UTXO_set. Upon processing
TXj , output Ref Out is not in the UTXO_set and system
T return ⊥ (Algorithm 1 line 5).
3) The output is in the UTXO_set and it is also con-
sumed by some transaction TXj : Similar to the second
case, but Ref Out is in the UTXO_set.
Therefore, given the same UTXO_set, and transac-
tions T , AT return ⊥ if and only if AU returns ⊥. Both
algorithms add the same set of outputs to the UTXO_set,
and remove the same set of utxos. No output can be
added to the UTXO_set twice, and any attempt to remove
an output twice results in ⊥. Thus the new UTXO_set
returned by each algorithm is identical.
From unified node to distributed node. We now show
that Ostraka is functionally indistinguishable from AU .
The distributed algorithm of Ostraka, denoted AO, is
shown in Algorithms 3–4. A Coordinator algorithm re-
ceives the UTXO_set and transaction set T as input. The
Coordinator algorithm first distributes the UTXO_set and
transactions among ` NSs. NSs begin validation by adding
all produced outputs in their set of transactions Ti, to
their local UTXO_shard. They proceed by requesting
missing output information from the relevant siblings.
Algorithm 3: Ostraka, AO
Input : Set of transactions T , UTXO_set
Output: New UTXO_set or ⊥
1 Distribute T into T1 . . . T` and UTXO_set into UTXO_set1
. . .UTXO_set`
2 for all NSs, Si ← S1 . . . S` do in parallel
3 Send (Ti, UTXO_seti) to NS Si
4 for NSs, Si ← S1 . . . S` do
5 Receive UTXO_seti
6 if Received ⊥ then
7 Return ⊥
8 else
9 UTXO_set← UTXO_set ∪ {UTXO_seti}
10 Return UTXO_set
Algorithm 4: Ostraka shard algorithm
Input : Set of transactions Ti, UTXO_shard
Output: New UTXO_set or ⊥
1 Add all produced outputs in Ti to the UTXO_shard
/* Request TX outputs */
2 Request all referenced outputs in Ti from siblings
3 Receive requests for missing outputs
4 foreach Requested Out do
5 if Requested Out 6∈ UTXO_shard then
6 Send ⊥ to Coordinator
7 else
8 UTXO_shard← UTXO_shard \ {Requested Out}
/* Receive TX outputs */
9 Send requested outputs to requesters
10 Receive requested outputs and add to UTXO_shard
/* Transaction validation */
11 foreach TX← t1, t2, . . . , tk ∈ Ti do
12 foreach Ref Out by TX do
13 if Ref Out 6∈ UTXO_set then
14 Send ⊥ to Coordinator
15 else
16 UTXO_shard← UTXO_shard \ {Ref Out}
17 Validate TX
18 return UTXO_shard
Once they receive the information, each NS proceeds to
validate its set of transactions. If some validation stage
fails the NS sends ⊥, otherwise the NS sends its updated
UTXO_shard. If all NSs returned updated sets, the coor-
dinator returns their union, otherwise ⊥. The pseudo-code
makes a slight simplification of Ostraka that nonetheless
represents its logical behavior.
We show that an unordered-system algorithm and Os-
traka are functionally indistinguishable.
Lemma 2. Given the same UTXO_set and set of trans-
actions T , AU and AO return the same value.
As before, we prove the lemma by showing that AU
returns ⊥ if and only if AO returns ⊥:
Proof. We prove in both directions.
AU → AO. We first show that if AU rejects an
input (T,UTXO_set) then AO also rejects this input.
If AU returns ⊥, there exists some transaction TXi ∈
T , and an input in TXi, referencing an UTXO Ref Out 6∈
UTXO_set, produced by an output TX out.
1) The UTXO is not in the UTXO_set and is not pro-
duced by any transaction in T : The UTXO is not produced
by any transaction in T , thus no NS receives a transaction
producing Ref Out in AO. WLOG, some NS Si receives
TXi. If Ref Out references an output assigned to a NS
Sj , when receiving request for Ref Out, Sj does not have
Ref Out in its UTXO_shard and send ⊥ (Alg. 4 line 6).
If Ref Out references a transaction assigned to Si, when
processing transactions, Ref Out is not in UTXO_shard
of Si, and Si sends ⊥ (line 14).
2) The UTXO is not in the UTXO_set and is produced
by some transaction TXk, but is also consumed by some
transaction TXj : WLOG, TX out is produced by a trans-
actions assigned to some NS Sk, and is added to its
UTXO_shard (Algorithm 4 line 1). If both consuming
transactions TXj and TXi, are assigned to sibling NSs,
then upon receiving all requests from sibling NSs, Sk
processes one of the requests first and remove Ref Out
from it UTXO_shard. Upon processing the second re-
quest, Ref Out is not in UTXO_shard, and Sk sends
⊥ (Algorithm 4 line 6). If TXj is assigned to a sibling
NS, and TXi is assigned to Sk, Ref Out is removed from
UTXO_shard after all outputs are requested. Upon pro-
cessing TXi, Sk does not have Ref Out in UTXO_shard,
and send ⊥ (Algorithm 4 line 14). If both TXi and
TXj are assigned to Sk, one of them is be processed
first and removes Ref Out from the UTXO_shard, and
upon processing the second one, Ref Out is not be in
UTXO_shard and Sk sends ⊥ (Algorithm 4 line 14).
3) The UTXO is in the UTXO_set and it is also con-
sumed by some transaction TXj : This is similar to the
second case, but TX out is in the UTXO_shard of Sk.
AO → AU . If AO returns ⊥ and rejects, then some
NS Si sends ⊥ to the Coordinator. This can be a result of
several cases, and we show that AU rejects as well.
First, notice that the UTXO_set and transactions T
are distributed deterministically. There can be no two NSs
producing the same TX out, and similarly, Ref Out cannot
reside in two UTXO-shards.
1) When processing requests for outputs, there is some
UTXO Ref Out 6∈ UTXO_shard
a) The UTXO is not in the UTXO_shard, is not produced
by any transaction in Ti, and is requested by some
sibling NS Sj . Then there exists some transaction TXj
∈ T consuming UTXO. As UTXO_set is distributed
deterministically, there can be no other UTXO_shard
other than UTXO_seti where the UTXO might reside.
Therefore, it is not in the UTXO_set of AU , and upon
processing TXj , AU returns ⊥ (Algorithm 2 line 7).
b) The UTXO is not in the UTXO_shard, is produced
by some transactions TXk, and is requested by some
two sibling NS Sj , Sl. Then there exist some two
transaction TXj and TXj ∈ T , consuming the same
UTXO. WLOG, in AU , TXj is processed first and
consumes the UTXO. Upon processing TXl, AU returns
⊥ (Algorithm 2 line 7).
2) When processing transactions, there exists some trans-
action TXi ∈ Ti, and an input in TXi, referencing an
UTXO Ref Out 6∈ UTXO_shard.
a) The UTXO is in the UTXO_shard and is requested
by some sibling NS Sj : There is some other transaction
TXj ∈ T consuming the UTXO. WLOG, in AU TXj is
processed first, and upon processing TXi, AU returns
⊥ (Algorithm 2 line 7).
b) The UTXO is not in the UTXO_shard, is produced by
some transaction TXk, and is requested by some sibling
NS Sj . The case is similar to the previous after all
outputs are added to the UTXO_set in Algorithm AU
(Algorithm 2 line 3).
c) The cases enumerated for AU are the same if all
transactions are assigned to a single NS, and are not
requested by any sibling.
Therefore, given the same UTXO_set, and transac-
tions T , AU return ⊥ if and only if AO returns ⊥.
We can now show that a classical topological-order
system with a unified node is functionally indistinguish-
able from an Ostraka node.
Theorem 1. Given the same UTXO_set and set of trans-
actions T , a topologically ordered system and Ostraka,
are functionally indistinguishable.
The proof follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 2.
5.2. Processing Time
We have shown the systems are functionally indistin-
guishable; it remains to show that an attacker cannot affect
block processing time in Ostraka more than it could in
a unified node. Limiting processing time is important to
prevent an attacker from strangling the system, creating a
major slowdown and loss of throughput.
Targeting a single NS. In a unified node, block pro-
cessing time is (roughly) the sum of processing all trans-
actions. In Ostraka it is the time it takes the slowest NS
to process its transactions.
If transaction distribution is identical for all nodes,
then an attacker can cheaply generate transactions that are
all placed in the same NS. For example, an attacker can
create a block where all transactions start with multiple
zeros in the MSB. In general, to create a transaction
starting with ` zeros, the attacker needs 2` attempts in
expectation. For a block of L transactions, a total of
L · 2` attempts are required in expectation. Note that this
analysis applies to any index function.
We denote by Df the distribution function applied to
TxHash to determine the NS responsible for it. For ` NSs,
the Df results in a number from 1 to `.
In Ostraka, we use a salt to redistributed transactions.
Each node is aware of the salt values of its neighbors. As
connections are performed randomly, it is unlikely a node
will obtain the values of all nodes in the system. Yet, even
if one obtains all salts, attack difficulty rises exponentially
with the number of targeted nodes.
Assume the attacker knows the salt values of
k peers, S1..Sk. We define the distribution func-
tion Df for a value x and a salt value Si to be
Df(x, Si) = SHA-256(x||Si). The first transaction the
attacker creates will result in some value vi for each of
the k peers. The attacker now needs every subsequent
transaction to result in the same value vi for each peer.
The attacker thus needs to find a TxHash such that:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k : Df(TxHash, Si) = vi. The probability of
finding such value, if the attacker tries to target one of `
NSs is (1/`)k. To cause an ` times slowdown for k peers,
requires `k attempts per transaction in expectation.
It quickly becomes infeasible to affect even a small
percentage of the system. For example, creating one trans-
action affecting the validation time of 100 nodes requires
the hashing rate of Bitcoin for 800,000 years [11].
Creating a single large transaction. Creating an
abnormally large single transaction occupying an entire
block can also cause a significant slowdown. In Ostraka,
each transaction is processed by a single NS. A huge
transaction that occupies an entire block, would annul
the benefits of the distributed architecture. Adding salt
does not help mitigate this attack vector. In Ostraka, we
mitigate this attack by adding a transaction size limit. The
limit should be proportional to the block size, to allow
even distribution of transactions across multiple NSs. In
general, a user can make any payment with only two types
of transactions. A join transaction of two outputs into one,
or a fork transaction of a single output into two.
6. Evaluation
The throughput of a blockchain depends on thop: the
time it takes for a single node to receive and process
the block. thop depends on both block transmission time
Btt and block processing time Bpt. Each node validates
the block before it propagates it further, to prevent DoS
attacks on the system [15], [17].
We present the measurements and theoretical analysis
of thop. We begin by describing our evaluation method-
ology (§6.1), and proceed to measure how the number
of NSs and the node bandwidth affects the thop (§6.2).
Similarly, we analyze and present the effect of intra-node
bandwidth (§6.3). We conclude with a network simula-
tion (§6.4).
6.1. Methodology
We have implemented the necessary elements for per-
formance evaluation based on the existing btcd Bitcoin
client [12]. We implement the intra-node and inter-node
networking, as well as our distributed block validation
protocol. In total, we have added 10K LoC in Go and an
additional 2K LoC of Python scripts for testing and simu-
lation. Our implementation is available as open source [3].
We measure block sending time between two Ostraka
nodes and block processing time on the receiving node.
We used a c4.large EC2 instance (2 vCPUs 4GB
RAM) for each NS and a c4.xlarge instance (4 vCPUs
8GB RAM) for the coordinator of each node. A block
comprises transactions with two inputs and two outputs,
i.e., about 250 Bytes, which is the median Bitcoin transac-
tion size. Each single EC2 NS can process approximately
1700 Tx/sec. Each block undergoes full validation, i.e.
we do not assume some of the transactions have been
previously known to the receiving node, and have already
been validated. Transaction dependency within the block
does not affect processing time, as transaction validation
is performed in distributed, achievable by our block vali-
dation algorithm. Each figure with error bars presents the
minimum, maximum, and average measurements. Theo-
retical analysis is presented where applicable.
6.2. Block time and node capacity
Total block time thop depends on both block transmis-
sion time Btt and block processing time Bpt. We begin
by isolating and evaluating the Bpt. We measure Bpt of
various configurations, without restriction on intra-node
or inter-node bandwidth.
The number of transactions in a block is the block
size, denoted BSize, divided by the mean transaction size,
denoted TxSize. NStps is the number of transactions per
second a NS can process. Bpt is thus the number of
transactions in a block divided by all NSs combined
processing rate : Bpt = BSizeTxSize · 1NStps·#NSs .
We measure the Bpt with an increasing number of
transactions. We repeat this experiment varying the num-
ber of NSs from 1 to 32. We estimate the number of
transactions each configuration processes in ten seconds
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from a linear regression. We find the maximum block
size a node is capable of processing within the limit.
Ten seconds was chosen arbitrarily to be an upper limit
on the processing time of each node. The two Unlimited
plots of Figure 5 show our measurements. The theoretical
unlimited bandwidth line represents the best achievable
results, multiplying the processing capacity of a single
NS by a factor. The error bars represent our actual mea-
surements. We observe that Ostraka achieves near-optimal
improvement as we increase the number of NSs.
Next, we add the effect of block transmission time
(Btt) on thop. Btt is determined by network latency
and bandwidth. The bandwidth, denoted BW, is the total
network bandwidth available to all the NSs combined.
We focus on network bandwidth as it is more significant
than the latency for large blocks [15]. We define a node’s
capacity as the number of total transactions per second a
node can receive and processes. The capacity is thus the
total number of transactions in a block BSizeTxSize , divided by
thop.
Capacity
[
TX
sec
]
=
1
TxSize
BW +
(
1
NStps·#NSs
) (1)
By adding more NSs we expect thop to approach Btt,
as Bpt approaches 0. We measure capacity when both the
network bandwidth and the number of NSs vary. We mea-
sure with configurations of 1,2,4,8,16 and 32 NSs, as well
as total bandwidth of 40 and 160Mbit/s for the combined
node. As before, we estimate capacity by evaluating the
linear regression at ten seconds.
Fig 5 shows capacity measurements as well as the-
oretical analysis. Error bars represent our measurements
for each configuration of bandwidth and NSs. The dashed
lines represent our theoretical analysis as shown in equa-
tion (1). Our measurements match our theoretical evalu-
ation: as we increase the number of NSs, the capacity of
the node increases, yet limited by the available bandwidth.
6.3. Intra-node network
Part of the Ostraka protocol is requesting and sending
outputs between NSs. When intra-node bandwidth is high,
time to send requests and later to send information to
requesting NSs is not significant. Ostraka can be imple-
mented to run on a single system, where NSs communicate
over Unix sockets, with much higher bandwidth. However,
we wanted to also examine the case of several distant NSs
with limited bandwidth between them. Limiting the intra-
node bandwidth would affect the Bpt.
For n transactions per block and ` NSs, each NS has
in expectation n`
`−1
` outputs it needs to request from its
siblings. This is also the number of outputs it is required
to send.
It is important to note that although the number of
siblings each NS must contact increases with the number
of NSs, the overall number of outputs requested/sent per
NS decreases. Thus, intra-node communication benefits
and decreases linearly as we add additional NSs.
We denote by BWNS the intra-node bandwidth and
by TXout, the expected size required for sending and
receiving outputs information per transaction. Bpt, when
accounting for intra-node communication is thus:
Bpt =
BSize
TxSize
· 1
#NSs
·
(
1
NStps
+
#NSs− 1
#NSs
· TXout
BWNS
)
We measure Bpt while restraining intra-node band-
width to 5Mbit/s, 1Mbit/s, 256Kbit/s per NS. Similarly to
previous experiments, we estimate processing capacity by
measuring Bpt for various block sizes. Since processing
time is higher, we look at 30 seconds for our linear
regression.
For 5Mbit/s, despite the limited bandwidth, the bene-
fits of distributing transaction validation and storage out-
weigh the limits of cross-NS communication.
For 256Kbit/s per NS, we observe a significant dip
in performance when moving from a single NS to two
NSs. This is the result of sending information across
NSs becoming dominant. Fig. 6 shows these effects. Our
theoretical evaluation falls within the margin of error.
When intra-node bandwidth is extremely limited, it is
more beneficial to operate a single NS.
6.4. Full System Simulation
Finally, to assess the benefits of increasing block
validation rate on a blockchain system, we take as an
example the Bitcoin-NG [20] protocol. We simulate 1,000
nodes implemented with Ostraka instead of unified nodes
as in the original paper. Each node is connected to 8 other
nodes at random, similar to Bitcoin. We target 10 minutes
between leader election blocks and 10 seconds between
microblocks, as Bitcoin-NG. We produce an event-driven
simulation, with identical node configurations, a network
topology similar to Bitcoin, and fixed bandwidth per node.
Fig. 7 shows the effect of adding additional NSs to each
node. Network topology and properties strongly affect the
protocol’s performance, but the trend is clear. Ostraka
allows the system to achieve an order of magnitude im-
provement in throughput.
TABLE 1. OSTRAKA COMPARED TO OTHER SYSTEMS
OmniLedger RapidChain Ostraka
Security 25% 33% 50%
Cross-Shard Tx By Clienta By leaderb Internal
Required Nodes hundreds hundreds any
Throughput 10k tx/sc 7.3k tx/sd 10k tx/se
DoS resilience 8 8 4
aClient must be online. bAssuming an honest leader. c400 nodes.
d1800 nodes, 12.5% adversary, e1000 nodes, with Bitcon-NG
Table 1 summarizes the comparison of Ostraka with
Bitcoin-NG, OmniLedger, and RapidChain (cf. §3). The
table compares results as reported by the two papers. We
compare the adversarial percentage of the network the sys-
tem is resilient against. In the case of Ostraka, we consider
the Bitcoin-NG PoW setup we used in our simulation.
Using the Bitcoin-NG consensus algorithm, the system is
resilient against a 49% adversary. OmniLedger and Rapid-
Chain require a high number of nodes and participants
to reach high throughput and good security guarantees.
Ostraka, on the other hand, does not require a lower
bound on the number of nodes. Deployed in democratic
environments, where voting power is distributed equally
across the network, Omniledger and RapidChain outper-
form Ostraka by sharding the bandwidth and the computa-
tional resources. However, in systems whose voting power
is not uniformly distributed (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum), it
is possible to apply the Ostraka design to reach high
throughput.
7. Conclusion
We present Ostraka, an architecture for scalable
blockchain nodes. Ostraka overcomes the security and
performance limitations of previous solutions and achieves
linear scaling in the number of node-shards. Our experi-
ments reached a rate of 400k tx/sec at the capacity of our
experimental testbed. Together with a high-performance
consensus protocol, Ostraka can saturate network capacity.
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